How New Accounting Rules Are Changing the Way CEOs Get
Paid
When a well-known
compensation consulting firm predicted in early April that new
accounting rules wouldn't have any impact on the use of options as
compensation for corporate executives, Wharton accounting professor
Mary
Ellen Carter was ready to disagree. "That's just not true," she
says. "Options will be cut and directors will be switching to
restricted stock for executive compensation."
Carter's response
is the result of her research into the role of accounting in the
design of CEO equity compensation, specifically as it relates to the
use of options and restricted stock. Her study coincides with a
ruling, implemented this year by the Financial Accounting Standards
Board (FASB), requiring all firms to expense the value of employee
stock options. Specifically, Carter looks at the accounting
practices of 1,500 firms from 1995 to 2001, before many large
companies began expensing stock options but during the years when
the FASB began pushing the reform. Carter corroborates the findings
of her study by examining changes in CEO compensation within firms
that voluntarily began to expense options in 2002 and 2003.
In a new paper on
this topic entitled, "The Role of Accounting in the Design of CEO
Equity Compensation," Carter concludes that CEO compensation will
change now that companies are required to subtract the expense of
stock options from their earnings, just as they are required to
account for salaries and other costs. And Carter predicts that as a
result, firms will switch from options to restricted stock as a
preferred compensation option.
"By eliminating the
financial reporting benefits of stock options, firms expensing stock
options no longer have an ability to avoid recording expenses with
any form of equity compensation," writes Carter, who authored the
study with Luann J. Lynch, a professor at the Darden Graduate School
of Business Administration, and Wharton accounting professor
Irem
Tuna.
"We found that
companies prior to the rule changes granted more options because of
favorable financial reporting. Results suggest that favorable
accounting treatment for stock options led to a higher use of
options and lower use of restricted stock than would have been the
case absent accounting considerations. Our findings confirm the role
of accounting in equity compensation design."
Leveling
the Playing Field
The timing of
Carter's report could hardly be better.
This past year, a
revised FASB rule took effect that requires companies to expense the
value of stock options given to employees. Most public companies are
required to expense options for fiscal years beginning after June
15, 2005. Since most companies operate on a calendar basis, this
means expensing options by March 31, 2006. Known as SFAS 123(R), the
new accounting standard was developed by the FASB to create a more
level playing field when it came to management incentive
compensation and its impact on a company's bottom line. Before SFAS
123(R), companies that gave out stock options did not have to report
the "fair value of the option" -- i.e., did not have to claim the
options as an expense, which in turn would result in a reduction in
net income at the end of the fiscal year. However, companies that
relied on cash bonuses or restricted stock for equity compensation
have always had to report or "expense" the value amount, an
accounting requirement that reduced corporate net income at year's
end.
The FASB first
proposed changing the accounting standard in 1991. At the time, the
move was strenuously opposed, particularly by many hi-tech firms and
start-up businesses that relied heavily on stock options as an
incentive to recruit and motivate employees to work for companies
that reported little or no income. As nearly everyone knows, stock
options are perks given to employees that allow them to buy company
stock in the future at a set price. If the stock rises before the
options are exercised, the employee can buy the stock at the lower
predetermined price, and then sell it at the higher price and
quickly realize the difference.
During the dot-com
boom, the use of stock options skyrocketed. According to the
National Center for Employee Ownership, up to 10 million employees
held stock options by 2002. "Stock options were always seen as an
incentive, a way of tying employee or executive action and company
performance to compensation," says Carter. "In other words, 'You
will get something if you get the stock price to go up.' It was a
way of aligning employees' and executives' interests with those of the shareholders."
But from the
beginning, companies balked at putting a numerical value on options
and expensing them, arguing that doing so would result in a negative
impact on their stock price. After intense lobbying, the FASB backed
off the proposal in the early 1990s, but issued a compromise, known
then as SFAS 123: Companies had to disclose the use of stock options
and their fair value in the footnotes of their financial reports or
proxy statements.
Nearly 10 years
later -- in the wake of the volatile post-Enron era, when improper
and unethical accounting practices were widely exposed in one
corporate scandal after another -- the FASB returned to the concept
of expensing stock options. At the time, corporate institutions like
Global Crossing and WorldCom, in addition to Enron, had became
synonymous with corporate greed, and anyone who followed their
downfalls quickly understood how company executives who held
substantial stock options were motivated to artificially inflate
stock prices for their own financial gain.
In an effort to
distance themselves from companies that routinely "cooked the
books," many corporations wanted to showcase their ethical financial
practices. So they began to voluntarily expense options in their
proxy statements, a step above and beyond the footnote citation
already required by the FASB. In 2002, General Electric, Bank One
Corp., Coca-Cola, The Washington Post Co., Procter & Gamble and
General Motors announced that they would expense options, along with
Amazon.com and Computer Associates. Some companies -- like Papa
John's International, USA Interactive and Microsoft -- announced
that they were doing away with options altogether.
The push for
corporate accountability and more transparent financial accounting
practices received an undisputed boost with the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, which required that
executives and auditors evaluate internal financial controls and be
accountable for financial statements. In turn, the FASB
responded in early 2004 by presenting the revised draft of its
accounting standard related to options expensing, or SFAS 123(R).
This time, there was little protest, primarily because companies had
already responded to the suggested changes and were resigned to the
practice of expensing options.
As
BusinessWeek reported on April 1, 2004: "Like an approaching
hurricane that generates more advance warnings than damaging winds,
FASB's proposed rule probably won't cause a lot of additional
change. Some 500 publicly traded companies have already started
expensing options, or said they will. Many have begun shifting
toward other non-option-based pay schemes that are likely to deliver
more motivational bang for their compensation bucks. And investors,
who can already look up option costs in the footnotes of companies'
quarterly financial reports, seem to have grown accustomed to
factoring the values of options into what stocks are worth."
What, then, was the
impact of accounting practices in the compensation choices for CEOs?
Noting that "prior literature is inconclusive," Carter set out to
determine if favorable accounting for stock options had motivated
the use of options, deterred the use of restricted stock, and led to
higher overall executive compensation. Carter and her fellow
researchers focused on the use of options in CEO compensation before
the new accounting standards went into effect -- through either
voluntary or required measures. They studied 6,242 executive
compensation packages from 1995 to 2001, using information from
ExecuComp, a database of executive compensation information that
covers the S&P 1500.
Carter's study
found that the "method of accounting for options has affected
decisions regarding their use." Among the findings:
- Between 1995 and
2001, approximately 80% of the ExecuComp firms were granting
options to CEOs, while only approximately 20% of these firms were
granting restricted stock to their CEOs.
- The use of stock
options increased steadily throughout the sample period.
Specifically, the percent of sample firms granting options to CEOs
increased from 76.5% in 1995 to 82.3% in 2001.
- Firms in the sample
used very little restricted stock compared with options. However,
the use of restricted stock to compensate CEOs increased steadily
throughout the study period, from 18% of firms in 1995 to 21.6% in
2001.
Notes Carter: "We
find that firms that are more concerned about the earnings they
report used more stock options in their equity compensation due to
the favorable accounting treatment for options, and that once firms
start expensing stock options, they shift into restricted stock. Our
analysis provides insight into what changes are likely to occur in
CEO equity compensation now that the FASB has made stock option
expensing mandatory: While we may not see an overall decrease in CEO
compensation, we anticipate a decline in stock option use and an
increase in the use of restricted stock."
Testing
the Hypotheses
To corroborate
these findings in her report, Carter also studied 206 firms from the
same ExecuComp database that began to expense stock options in 2002
or 2003. Carter's goal was to determine "whether firms that expense
stock options alter CEO equity compensation packages in response to
the decision to expense options." Based on these firms' experiences,
"we examine changes in the structure of CEO pay packages concurrent
with and after the decision to expense options," Carter says. "Using
this sample, we are able to test our hypotheses without having to
rely on a proxy for firms' financial reporting concerns. Our
findings confirm the role of accounting in equity compensation
design. We find that firms expensing options decrease compensation
from options and increase compensation from restricted stock, even
after controlling for standard economic determinants of compensation
and general economic trends."
For instance,
Carter found that before expensing options, 88.7% of the firms in
this sub-group were granting options as part of a CEO's
compensation; during the year the firm first expensed options, the
number of firms granting options dropped 18.6%, down to 68.9%; the
year after expensing for the first time, the number of firms
granting options dropped further to 64.3% for a total decrease of
23.7%. In contrast, the number of firms granting restricted stock to
CEOs grew from 42.8% in the year before expensing options to 55% the
year after expensing, an increase of 12.2%.
During an
interview, Carter pointed to proxy statements from the following two
corporations to illustrate how companies shifted from options to
restricted stock for CEO compensation:
From Liberty
Property Trust, proxy statement filed on 3/26/2004: In making
long-term incentive compensation awards with respect to 2003, the
Compensation Committee, as it did with respect to 2002, placed
greater emphasis on restricted shares and less emphasis on options
as compared to past awards of long-term incentive compensation....
In part, this change is a reflection of the Trust's determination to
begin in 2003 to record options as an expense at the time of
issuance. Additionally, greater reliance on restricted shares
reduces the potential dilutive impact from option grants. This
change is intended to provide appropriate long-term incentive to
Named Executive Officers that is competitive and consistent with the
interests of shareholders.
From FBL Financial
Group, proxy statement filed on 3/31/2004: For 2004 we have
included grants of performance-based restricted stock to the
executive group. This change is partially in response to our
expensing of stock option costs, and partially to create more
performance based incentives for this key group. We traditionally
grant stock options to executives and other key employees each
January 15. For the 2004 grant, we have determined a target level of
incentive awards to this group, then divided it by value, 50% in
stock options and 50% in performance-based restricted stock.
And what, if
anything, happened to the amount of executive pay packages? Carter
found "no evidence of a decrease in total compensation" to CEOs once
companies expensed options. The fact that executive pay did not
decrease led Carter to one of two conclusions: Either the favorable
accounting treatment for stock options did not lead to higher levels
of executive compensation "or firms find it difficult to downsize
the large executive pay packages that resulted from the favorable
accounting treatment for stock options," Carter writes.
In summary, Carter
concluded, the fact that "firms are granting fewer options and more
restricted stock suggests that these firms are shifting towards
restricted stock [in order to] provide longer-term performance
incentives, and that there will likely be changes in CEO
compensation now that SFAS 123(R) is effective. Though firms may
have appeared to favor options, under a regime of mandatory
expensing, the role of options in executive compensation may be
restricted."
Like an asterisk at
the bottom of a key paragraph, Carter and many others who studied
the ramifications of options expensing admit that the drop in
granting stock options is something of an "unintended consequence"
of the new FASB requirement. Why? Because the financial markets have
proven to be relatively efficient; the accounting change to options
expensing has actually not resulted in a significant drop in
corporate stock prices, a byproduct once feared by companies opposed
to the change. In 2004, a study by compensation consultant Towers
Perrin of 335 companies that voluntarily began to expense options
found no impact on their stock prices; another study by Bear,
Stearns & Co in 2004 predicted that the options expensing change
would reduce reported earnings of S&P 500 companies by less than
3%, according to BusinessWeek.
"There really
shouldn't be a problem," Carter says. "The value of the options was
in the footnotes. Anyone who is a hard-core market efficiency person
would say that any information that is public is already included in
the stock valuation. So expensing options shouldn't be making any
difference at all. But it is. Companies are cutting back on options
because they believe that there is an impact to expensing, but there
really shouldn't be."
Published: May 3, 2006
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